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Space and time are intimately linked in the human mind, but different theories make
different predictions about the nature of this relationship. Metaphor Theory (MT) predicts
an asymmetric relationship between space and time. By contrast, A Theory of Magnitude
(ATOM) does not predict any cross-dimensional asymmetry, since according to ATOM
spatial and temporal extents are represented by a common neural metric for analog
magnitude. To date, experiments designed to contrast these theories support MT over
ATOM, in adults and children. Yet, proponents of ATOM have questioned whether some
of the observed cross-dimensional asymmetries could be task-related artifacts. Here we
conducted a test of the asymmetric relationship between space and time in children’s
minds, equating the perceptual availability of spatial and temporal information in the
stimuli more stringently than in previous experiments in children. Results showed the
space-time asymmetry predicted by MT. For the same stimuli (i.e., snails racing along
parallel paths), spatial information influenced temporal judgments more than temporal
information influenced spatial judgments. These results corroborate previous findings in
Greek children and extend them to children who speak Dutch and Brazilian Portuguese.
The space-time asymmetry in children’s judgments is not due to task-related differences
in the perceptual availability of spatial and temporal information in the stimuli; rather, it
appears to be a consequence of how spatial and temporal representations are associated
in the child’s mind.
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INTRODUCTION
Space and time are intimately linked in the human mind. This
relationship, which has long been a topic of philosophical inquiry
(Locke, 1689/1995; Bergson, 1889/1910), has also been the subject
of psychological experiments since the nineteenth century (e.g.,
Mach, 1886/1897; Benussi, 1913; Piaget, 1927/1969; Boroditsky,
2000; Núñez and Sweetser, 2006; Vicario et al., 2007; Casasanto
and Boroditsky, 2008; Miles et al., 2010; Srinivasan and Carey,
2010; Santiago et al., 2011; Ulrich et al., 2012).
In the twenty-first century, two theories have motivated
numerous experiments on relationships between space and time:
A Theory of Magnitude (ATOM; Walsh, 2003) and Metaphor
Theory (MT; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). These theories lead to
different predictions about exactly how space and time are related
in our brains and minds.
According to ATOM, space, time and other prothetic domains1
such as numerosity and brightness are represented in the brain
and mind by a common analog magnitude system. Support
for ATOM comes from behavioral experiments showing cross-
dimensional priming or interference between different prothetic
domains (Henik and Tzelgov, 1982; Dormal and Pesenti, 2007;
1Prothetic domains are domains in which people can experience quantita-
tive variation (e.g., more or less size, duration, brightness, etc.), whereas only
qualitative variation is possible within metathetic domains (e.g., hue, pitch,
timbre; Stevens, 1957).
Bueti and Walsh, 2009), and from neuroimaging studies showing
that magnitude processing in various domains activates overlap-
ping areas in the parietal lobe (Fias et al., 2003; Pinel et al., 2004;
Dormal and Pesenti, 2009; cf., Gijssels et al., 2013).
Implicit in ATOM is an assumption that these “ATOMic”
domains are symmetrically interrelated. Accordingly, Walsh
(2003) frames predictions in symmetrical terms, positing “over-
lapping brain regions” and “cross-domain, within-magnitude
priming,” without specifying any directionality to the priming or
interference effects. If space and time are both represented by the
same general-purpose analog magnitude metric, there is no a pri-
ori reason to posit that representations in one domain should
depend asymmetrically on representations in the other.
By contrast, according to MT (e.g., Lakoff and Johnson, 1999),
representations of time and number depend asymmetrically on
representations of space. The claim that some domains tend to
be asymmetrically dependent on others in our mental represen-
tations, which is at the core of MT, was originally supported
by patterns in metaphorical language. In English, it is nearly
impossible to talk about domains like time without using words
whose primary meaning is spatial [denotatively, developmentally,
or historically (Clark, 1973)]. Vacations can be long or short,
meetings can be moved forward or pushed back, deadlines can
loom ahead or lie behind us. Although it is also possible to
use temporal words to talk about space, time-to-space mappings
in language are far less common than space-to-time mappings
www.frontiersin.org November 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 803 | 1
05
Bottini and Casasanto Space and time in the child’s mind
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). This asymmetry in language has been
echoed by behavioral findings in psycholinguistics (Boroditsky,
2000), cognitive development, (Casasanto et al., 2010), and
psychophysics (Casasanto and Boroditsky, 2008; Bottini and
Casasanto, 2010; Merritt et al., 2010), and also by asymmet-
ric activation of the hypothetical “ATOM area” in the brain, the
Inferior Parietal Cortex, during encoding of spatial vs. temporal
information (Gijssels et al., 2013).
In the first set of psychophysical studies that was designed to
test for a space-time asymmetry, participants viewed lines of vari-
ous spatial lengths that appeared on a screen for varying durations
(Casasanto and Boroditsky, 2008). They were asked to estimate
either the duration or the spatial length of each line by clicking the
mouse to indicate the starting and ending points of each spatial or
temporal interval. Spatial and temporal extents were fully crossed
in the stimuli. Results showed that participants were unable to
ignore irrelevant spatial information when making judgments
about duration, but not the converse. For stimuli of the same aver-
age duration, lines that extended a shorter distance in space were
judged to take a shorter time, and lines that extended a longer
distance were judged to take a longer time. By contrast, for stim-
uli of the same average spatial length, spatial estimation was not
affected by the line’s duration. The cross-domain asymmetry that
was predicted on the basis of patterns in language was found in
non-linguistic psychophysical judgments. Five follow-up experi-
ments varied the attentional, mnemonic, and perceptual demands
of the stimuli, and all six experiments supported the same conclu-
sion: mental representations of time depend on representations of
space, more than vice versa.
This robust space-time asymmetry supports MT, but presents
a challenge to ATOM. If spatial and temporal extent are both
represented by a general-purpose magnitude metric, then why
should representations of time depend on representations of
space more than the other way around—in adults and chil-
dren, and in language and thought? Proponents of ATOM have
acknowledged that cross-domain asymmetries are problematic
for the theory, and have argued that perhaps observed asymme-
tries could be attributed to task-related factors, such as differ-
ences in the discriminability of the stimuli across dimensions.
According to Bueti and Walsh (2009) “whether these findings are
evidence of constant asymmetries or are task dependent remains
to be established” (p. 1833; see also Lourenco and Longo, 2011).
We agree that some of the cross-domains asymmetries that
have been reported may be artifacts of imbalances built into the
stimuli or the tasks, especially in studies that were not designed
to test for cross-domain asymmetries (e.g., Dormal and Pesenti,
2007). But several studies have been designed expressly for this
purpose, using Garner-like interference tasks (Garner, 1976) in
which participants judged either the spatial or the temporal
dimension of each stimulus, while attempting to ignore the irrele-
vant dimension (e.g., Casasanto and Boroditsky, 2008; Casasanto
et al., 2010; Merritt et al., 2010; Gijssels et al., 2013). The dis-
criminability of stimuli and the complexity of the responses
in each domain were controlled. Participants’ accuracy within
each domain was matched to ensure that cross-domain asym-
metries were not the result of judgments in one domain being
“messy” (and therefore more susceptible to cross-dimensional
interference) and judgments in the other domain being rel-
atively “clean” (and therefore resistant to cross-dimensional
interference). In short, these studies were designed to elimi-
nate task-related asymmetries between domains, and numerous
theory-irrelevant explanations for the observed space-time asym-
metries were ruled out through a series of experiments spanning
several years and several papers.
Still, we agree with Bueti and Walsh (2009) that cross-domain
asymmetries should only be considered challenges to ATOM to
the extent that theory-irrelevant task-related causes of the asym-
metry can be ruled out. To this end, in the present study we seek
to address a potential weakness of the task used by Casasanto et al.
(2010) to test for a space-time asymmetry in children. In the orig-
inal study children watched movies of two snails traveling along
parallel paths for different distances and durations. At the end of
each movie the children were asked to judge which of the two
snails moved for a longer time or for a longer distance. Spatial
and temporal distances were fully crossed in the stimuli. Results
showed that temporal judgments were influenced by the spatial
information more than vice versa, consistent with the results of
the analogous psychophysical tasks in adults.
Casasanto et al. (2010) noted that one aspect of their stim-
uli merited further consideration. On the critical trials testing for
cross-dimensional interference, children received exactly the same
spatial and temporal information before answering either the spa-
tial or the temporal questions (i.e., they saw the same movies of
racing snails). This task was a digital adaptation of a task Piaget
(1927/1969) conducted using mechanical snails racing across a
physical surface. The authors made an effort to preserve impor-
tant regularities of the physical world in their digital facsimile.
As a result, the snails remained on the screen in their final “rest-
ing” positions at the end of the race (as wind-up snails would if
they were racing across a real tabletop). Therefore, children had
a persistent, visible spatial cue to refer to when judging the rela-
tive distance of the snails, but no persistent, visible temporal cue
when judging their relative duration. This fact about the stimuli
reflects a simple fact of the physical world: unlike spatial relation-
ships, which can often be inspected and reinspected, temporal
relationships are by their nature neither persistent nor visible.
Could this feature of the stimuli be responsible for the
observed cross-dimensional asymmetry? This is unlikely to be
the case, since none of the otherwise analogous psychophysical
experiments in adults had this potential problem. But we cannot
rule out the possibility that the space-time asymmetry reported
by Casasanto et al. (2010) was produced (or enhanced) by this
imbalance in the perceptual availability of spatial and temporal
information. Here we conducted a stronger test of the hypothe-
sized space-time asymmetry in children, controlling spatial and
temporal aspects of the stimuli even more stringently than they
are “controlled” in the natural world. In this version of the exper-
iment, the two snails disappeared at the end of the race, as soon
as they had both stopped moving. Therefore, no visible record
of the distance the snails had traveled remained during the ques-
tion period, equating the perceptual availability of spatial and
temporal information. If the persistence of spatial (but not tem-
poral) information on the screen at the end of the snail races was
responsible for the observed space-time asymmetry in the earlier
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition November 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 803 | 2
Bottini and Casasanto Space and time in the child’s mind
study, the asymmetry should be attenuated or extinguished in the
present version of the experiment. Alternatively, if the observed
space-time asymmetry found previously reflected the way space
and time tend to be related in children’s mental representations of
motion events, then the asymmetry should persist.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Fifty-six children (4–10 years old) participated to the experiment.
Half of the children were native Dutch speakers living in the
Netherlands, and the other half were native Portuguese speak-
ers living in Brazil. Dutch children ranged in age from 4- to
9-year-old (Mean= 6.6, SD = 1.8), Brazilian children from 6 - to
10-year-old (Mean = 7.7, SD = 1.4).
The study has been conducted under the strict respect of the
World Medical Association’s Declaration of Helsinki. Children
participated in the experiments after receiving the express written
consent from their parents.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
The materials and procedure were identical to those used by
Casasanto et al. (2010) with the following exceptions. First, in the
original experiment the stimuli remained on the screen while chil-
dren responded to the experimenter’s questions; in this version of
the experiment the stimuli were removed from the screen during
the question period. Second, materials were translated into Dutch
for children tested in The Netherlands, and into Portuguese for
the children tested in Brazil.
The experiment had a 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 design: Target
Dimension (Space, Time), and Dimensional Interference
(Cross-Dimensional Interference, No Cross- Dimensional
Interference) were within-subjects factors, and Age (Younger,
Older) and Language (Dutch, Portuguese) were between-subjects
factors. In the cross-dimensional interference tasks children
were required to make either a temporal or spatial judgment in
presence of competing information from the other dimension.
For the non-interference tasks, children judged distance or
duration without any competing information from the other
dimension.
Each participant performed three tasks: Racing Snails
(Distance–Time interference task), Jumping Snails (to test chil-
dren’s ability to judge duration independent of spatial interfer-
ence), and Static Lines (to test children’s ability to judge distance
independent of temporal interference). Each task is described
below.
Stimuli were presented on a Macintosh laptop (resolution =
1024 × 768 pixels) and were followed by written questions (dis-
played for the experimenter’s benefit). The first question of each
trial was intended to focus children’s attention on the stimulus
event and to allow the experimenter to evaluate whether the child
was paying attention. The second question, which asked children
to judge either relative distance or relative duration, was of critical
interest.
The experiments were conducted in the children native lan-
guage by a native Dutch speaker for children tested in the
Netherlands and a native Portuguese speaker for children tested
in Brazil. Children were tested individually at their schools,
in a private room away from other children. Each child com-
pleted a total of 18 trials (12 cross-dimensional interference
trials and six no-interference control trials). Testing lasted about
10–15min.
Racing snails (Space-time interference task)
Two snails, one above the other, began at the left edge of the screen
and “raced” rightward along parallel tracks. One snail was blue
and the other red, so that they would be visually discriminable
and easy for the child to name (e.g., “the blue one”). The assign-
ment of colors to the top and bottom snails was counterbalanced
across participants.
There were three types of movies, placing the snails in dif-
ferent space–time relationships relative to one another. The
two snails traveled: (a) Different distance, different time, (b)
Different distance, same time, or (c) Same distance, different
time. Distances traveled were either 400 or 600 pixels, and
durations of travel were either 4 or 6 s. There were two vari-
ants of each movie type, in which either the top or the bot-
tom snail traveled longer in space or time. This control was
implemented in case participants who had an overall pref-
erence to choose the snail on the top or the bottom. This
resulted in six movies that could be viewed serially without
repetition.
Each participant saw all six of the Racing Snails movies twice,
once in each of two blocks: a Time Question block and a Space
Question block. The order of movies within each block was
randomized.
At the beginning of each question block the experimenter
encouraged the child to pay attention either to the distance trav-
eled by the snails or to the duration of the snails’ movement.
In the space question block, after each movie, the participant
was asked two questions: 1 “Did the two snails stop at the same
place?” 2. “Did one of the snails go farther?” and if the child
responded affirmatively without specifying which snails had gone
farther, the experimenter asked: “Which one of the two?” In the
time question block children saw the same 6 movies, but were
asked about the temporal aspect of the snails’ movement. After
each movie the experiment asked: 1 “Did the two snails stop at the
same time?” 2. “Did one of the snails move for a longer time?” and
if necessary, “Which one?”
In the previous version of this experiment (Casasanto et al.,
2010) all stimuli remained in their final resting positions until
after the child responded. In this version of the experiment the
two snails disappeared when both had stopped moving.
Static lines (Distance estimation control task)
The static lines task was used to test children’s ability to make
distance judgments without any competing temporal informa-
tion. Children judged three pairs of static lines presented one pair
at a time, one above the other. One line was red and the other
blue, with the colors of the top and bottom lines counterbalanced
across participants. The lines were either 400 or 600 pixels in
length and came in three combinations: (a) top line longer, (b)
bottom line longer, or (c) both lines the same length (600 pixels).
The experimenter asked: 1. “Are the lines the same length?” 2. “Is
one of the lines longer?” and if necessary, “Which one is longer?”
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Bouncing snails (Duration estimation control task)
The bouncing snails task tested children’s ability to make dura-
tion judgments without any competing distance information.
Children judged three movies of the red and blue snails bounc-
ing up and down in place, one above the other. The colors of the
top and bottom snails were counterbalanced across participants.
Each of the snails bounced for either 4 or 6 s, in one of three com-
binations: (a) top snail bounced longer, (b) bottom snail bounced
longer, or (c) both snails bounced for the same duration (6 s).
Although the snails traveled a small distance up and down while
bouncing, there was no lateral motion and no net displacement.
The experimenter asked: 1. “Did the two snails stop at the same
time?” 2. “Did one of the snails move for a longer time?” and if
necessary, “Which one?”
RESULTS
We analyzed the proportion of correct responses from each of the
two groups of participants (Dutch, Brazilian) with a multiple lin-
ear regression with Target Dimension (Space, Time), Interference
(With Interference, Without Interference) and the interaction of
these two factors as predictors.
In both groups there was a main effect of Interference [Dutch:
F(1) = 26.99, p = 0.001, r2 = 0.16; Brazilian: F(1) = 34.13, p =
0.001, r2 = 0.19], indicating better performance during the
no-interference tasks (Jumping Snails and Static Lines) than
during the cross-dimensional interference task (Racing Snails).
Additionally, there was a main effect of Target Dimension [Dutch:
F(1) = 22.19, p = 0.001, r2 = 0.13; Brazilian: F(1) = 30.48, p =
0.001, r2 = 0.17], indicating better performance during Space
trials compared to Time trials, overall. Crucially, there was
also a highly significant interaction of Interference and Target
Dimension [Dutch: F(1) = 16.53, p = 0.001, r2 = 0.09; Brazilian:
F(1) = 8.69, p = 0.003, r2 = 0.05], indicating that the effect of
cross-dimensional interference was much greater for duration
judgments than for distance judgments (Figure 1).
To analyze the effect of age on the magnitude of the cross-
dimensional asymmetry, we divided both groups of participants
in younger (≤7 years old) and older (>7 years old) children and
added to the model the factor Age (Younger, Older) letting it
interact with Target Dimension and Interference. Crucially, the
three way interaction of Target Dimension, Interference and Age
did not approach significance for either group [Dutch: F(1) =
0.42, n.s., r2 = 0.001; Brazilian: F(1) = 1.91, n.s., r2 = 0.01],
indicating that the strength of the space-time asymmetry did not
change significantly with age (consistent with Casasanto et al.’s
(2010) results).
Next, we tested whether the magnitude of the space-time
asymmetry varied across language groups. We run a multiple
linear regression with Interference (With Interference, Without
Interference), Target Dimension (Space, Time), Language (Dutch,
Portuguese) and their interactions as predictors of the proportion
of correct responses. There was a main effect of Language [F(1) =
53.19, p = 0.001, r2 = 0.18], indicating that Dutch children were
over-all more accurate than Brazilian ones. Nevertheless, the
critical three-way interaction of Target Dimension, Interference
and Language did not approach significance [F(1) = 0.30, n.s.,
r2 = 0.001], indicating that the magnitude of the space-time
asymmetry did not vary across language groups (Figure 2).
Did the observed space-time asymmetry arise because space
judgments were easier than time judgments (as indicated by the
FIGURE 1 | Effect of cross-dimensional interference on spatial and temporal judgments for Dutch (A) and Brazilian (B) children. In both cases the effect
of distance interference on duration judgments was greater than the effect of duration interference on distance judgments. Error bars show s.e.m.
FIGURE 2 | Comparison of cross-dimensional interference effects for Dutch (A) and Brazilian (B) children. Error bars indicate s.e.m.
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main effect of Target Dimension)? The fact that we found a
highly significant interaction of Interference by Target Domain
in each language group of participants argues against this possi-
bility. Children were not simply bad at judging time and good at
judging space: they were particularly bad at judging time in the
presence of spatial interference (much more than vice-versa).
For instance, a comparison of the Dutch children’s accuracy
in the Static Lines vs. Bouncing Snails tasks suggests that they
were about equally good at judging space per se and time per
se [t(27) = 1.44, p = 0.16]; yet, they showed a highly significant
cross-dimensional asymmetry. Could the critical interaction of
Interference by Target Domain that demonstrates this asymmetry
be created by a ceiling effect in the non-interference conditions?
This is unlikely: Brazilian children’s performance was not at ceil-
ing (i.e., performance was significantly lower than 100% accurate)
in the Bouncing Snails task [t(27) = 4.49, p = 0.001, one-tailed]
or the Static Lines task [t(27) = 3.27, p = 0.001, one-tailed], yet
they show the predicted cross-dimensional asymmetry.
Brazilian children were significantly better at judging space per
se (Static Lines) than time per se [Bouncing Snails; t(27) = 2.57,
p = 0.02]. Could the difference in performance between spatial
and temporal judgments be responsible for the critical space-time
asymmetry observed in the Racing Snails task? To provide fur-
ther evidence against this possibility, we conducted an analysis in
which we equated performance on the spatial and temporal con-
trol tasks, including only those Brazilian children who performed
perfectly on both the Jumping Snails and Static Lines tasks (n =
12). In this subsample, spatial judgments were still more accurate
than temporal judgments in the Racing Snails task [F(1) = 19.76,
p = 0.001, r2 = 0.13]. Even when children were matched on their
ability to judge relative distance and relative duration, per se,
their judgments under cross-dimensional interference conditions
revealed the predicted space-time asymmetry.
DISCUSSION
When asked to judge spatial or temporal extent, children were
much better at judging distance in the presence of temporal
interference than judging duration in the presence of spatial
interference. This asymmetric pattern of cross-dimensional inter-
ference was found even in children who were 100% accurate
when asked to judge spatial and temporal extent, per se, in the
absence of competing information from the irrelevant dimension
(i.e., in the control conditions). This finding replicates the results
of Casasanto et al. (2010), and rules out the skeptical possibil-
ity that the cross-dimensional asymmetry reported in this earlier
study was due to the fact that spatial information remained visi-
ble while children were responding but temporal information did
not. Furthermore, the present results extend the earlier findings
in Greek children to Dutch and Brazilian children, providing evi-
dence of the generality of the space-time asymmetry in children’s
minds.
IS THE SPACE-TIME ASYMMETRY DUE TO CROSS-DOMAIN
DIFFERENCES IN THE PERCEPTUAL DISCRIMINABILITY OF SPATIAL
AND TEMPORAL STIMULI?
Did the space-time asymmetry, found here and in previous
experiments, arise because space was more discriminable than
time in the stimuli? There is evidence that this is not the case.
Discriminability refers to the psychological difference between
stimulus values along a dimension (Melara and Mounts, 1993;
Algom et al., 1996). Two dimensions are equally discriminable
when the values along one dimension are equally different psy-
chologically compared to the values along the other dimension
(Melara and Mounts, 1993). In principle, differences in discrim-
inability between space and time could complicate the interpre-
tation of cross-dimensional interference effects, since differences
in discriminability can give rise to asymmetric patterns of inter-
ference, with the more discriminable domain interfering with the
less discriminable one more than vice versa (Melara and Mounts,
1993; Algom et al., 1996; Pansky and Algom, 1999).
Differences in discriminability correspond to differences in
the accuracy, precision, speed or variability of judgments across
domains (Melara and Mounts, 1993; Algom et al., 1996; Pansky
and Algom, 1999; Santiago et al., 2011). Importantly, in previ-
ous studies supporting the space-time asymmetry (Casasanto and
Boroditsky, 2008; Casasanto et al., 2010; Merritt et al., 2010),
within-domain performance was equivalent across space and
time. That is, judgments of duration were just as precise and
accurate as judgments of spatial length. Similarly, in the current
experiment, Dutch children were equally accurate in judging time
per se and space per se, yet they showed the predicted space-
time asymmetry. Brazilian children, who showed better accuracy
in spatial judgments overall, continued showing the predicted
asymmetry when their performance on temporal and spatial
judgments was matched.
The question of whether the space-time asymmetry found in
humans depends on asymmetries in the perceptual discriminabil-
ity of spatial and temporal stimuli was addressed decisively in an
experiment by Bottini and Casasanto (2010). In this experiment,
the possibility of differences in the perceptual discriminability of
spatial vs. temporal stimuli was completely eliminated. Dutch-
speaking participants saw 7- letter nouns that named concrete
objects of various spatial lengths (tr. pencil, bench, clothesline)
and estimated howmuch time they remained on the screen. A dif-
ferent group of participants saw nouns naming temporal events
of various durations (tr. blink, party, season) and estimated the
words’ spatial length. The implicit length encoded in object nouns
modulated time estimates, but the implicit duration encoded in
event nouns did not affect estimates of spatial length. Nouns that
named short objects were judged to remain on the screen for a
shorter time, and nouns that named longer objects to remain
for a longer time. By contrast, variations in the duration of the
event nouns’ referents had no effect on judgments of the words’
spatial length on the screen. Since in this study there was no per-
ceptible variation of the interfering domain (space and time only
varied implicitly, according to the length of the words’ referents),
the asymmetric pattern of cross-dimensional interference cannot
be attributed to differences in the perceptual discriminability of
space and time in the stimuli.
Further evidence that the space-time asymmetry is due to
the way these dimensions tend to be represented in the human
mind, and not to task-related differences in perceptual dis-
criminability across domains, comes from a study with non-
human primates. Merritt et al. (2010) had both humans and
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rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) perform Garner-like space-
time interference tasks. Discrimination sensitivities were similar
for space and time in both monkeys and humans (as measured
by the comparison of Weber fractions), but humans showed the
expected space-time asymmetry whereas monkeys did not. Space-
time interference was symmetric in monkeys but asymmetric
in humans even though spatial and temporal judgments were
matched for discriminability in both groups, demonstrating that
that the cross-dimensional asymmetry can appear (or not appear)
independently of the relative discriminability of space and time.
More fundamentally, Merritt et al.’s (2010) comparison of
monkeys and humans definitively rules our any possible expla-
nation for the humans’ space-time asymmetry in terms of an
imbalance between space and time inherent in the stimuli. Given
the same stimuli and the same task, monkeys showed symmetric
space-time interference (with the pattern trending, in fact, toward
the opposite of the expected asymmetry), whereas humans showed
the expected space-time asymmetry. In the experiments reviewed
above, the locus of the space-time asymmetry is not in the stimuli
or the tasks, but rather in the human observers’ minds.
To summarize this point, although differences in discrim-
inability across perceptual domains can cause asymmetric pat-
terns of cross-domain interference (Melara and Mounts, 1993;
Algom et al., 1996; Pansky and Algom, 1999, 2002) this was not
the cause of the space-time asymmetry observed across several
studies that were expressly designed to test for this asymmetry.
The asymmetric dependence of time on space in people’s judg-
ments is not an artifact of perceptual asymmetries built into the
stimuli or the tasks. Rather, this performance asymmetry reflects
the way space and time tend to be represented in the humanmind.
DO TAU AND KAPPA EFFECTS CONSTITUTE EVIDENCE AGAINST
METAPHOR THEORY?
The Tau and Kappa effects have been repeatedly observed in sev-
eral psychophysical experiments (Benussi, 1913; Cohen et al.,
1954; Price-Williams, 1954; Jones and Huang, 1982; Sarrazin
et al., 2004). In the classic setup participants are asked to com-
pare two spatiotemporal intervals delimited by three light bulbs
that are rapidly flashed in succession.When participants are asked
to compare the duration of the two intervals, their judgments are
modulated by the spatial distance between the flashes: greater dis-
tances correspond to greater duration judgments (Kappa effect).
Similarly, distance judgments also increase as a function of the
duration between successive flashes (Tau effect). Together, the
Tau and Kappa effects are sometimes interpreted as inconsistent
with the space-time asymmetry predicted by MT (Lourenco and
Longo, 2011).
At first glance, the existence of both Tau and Kappa effects
may seem at odds with a space-time asymmetry, but these find-
ings can be easily reconciled. First, MT can accommodate Tau-like
effects since it predicts an asymmetrical (hence bidirectional)
relationship between space and time, not a unidirectional one.
The prediction of asymmetry—not unidirectionality—has been
explicit since MT’s inception (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), and is
motivated by the asymmetry (not unidirectionality) of source and
target domains in linguistic metaphors. It is very common and
nearly obligatory in English to use spatial expressions for time, it
is also possible (albeit far less common) to use temporal expres-
sions for space (e.g., “we’re just a few blocks from the station” can
mean “it will take us a short time to reach the station” Casasanto
and Boroditsky, 2008).MT assumes bidirectional transfer between
source and target domains, which is more frequent, productive,
and automatic in one direction than the other. Effects of time on
space are not at odds with MT, so long as (under adequately con-
trolled conditions) a greater or more frequent effect of space on
time is also found.
Second, as suggested by Casasanto and Boroditsky (2008), the
Tau and Kappa effects are no challenge to the space-time asymme-
try whatsoever if, as the leading account of these effects suggests,
they do not show effects of space on time or of time on space, per
se. Although a complete explanation of the Tau and Kappa effects
is still missing, the most successful account of this effect is the
“Imputed Velocity Hypothesis” (Jones and Huang, 1982). On this
view Tau and Kappa effects arise because “subjects impute uni-
form motion to discontinuous displays” (Jones and Huang, 1982,
p. 183). That is, the succession of discrete flashes is computed
as the continuous movement of one flash, to which a constant
velocity is intuitively attributed. The attribution of a constant
velocity to the apparently moving stimulus creates the illusion
that the stimulus is moving for a farther distance when the dura-
tion between the flashes is extended, or that the motion takes a
longer time when the distance between flashes is extended. The
Imputed Velocity Hypothesis is supported by several experiments
showing the effect of acceleration patterns on the magnitude of
Kappa and Tau effects, both in vision and audition (Jones and
Huang, 1982; Henry and McAuley, 2009; Henry et al., 2009).
In conclusion, Tau and Kappa effects seem to be effects of
imputed velocity on judgments of both time and space, rather
than mutual effects between temporal and spatial aspects of the
events, and are therefore irrelevant to the question of whether
space and time have symmetric or asymmetric effects on one
another (Casasanto and Boroditsky, 2008).
CAN TIME EVER INFLUENCE SPACE IN OUR MINDS?
There is no question that time can influence spatial thoughts
and behaviors under some circumstances, just as time sometimes
serves as a source domain for space in metaphorical language (see
§5.2). But as we have argued above, the simple fact of a bidirec-
tional relationship between space and time in language, thought,
and behavior is no challenge to the claim that time is asymmet-
rically dependent on space in our minds, which is supported by
a variety of evidence suggesting that the use of space to represent
time is more frequent, flexible, and automatic than the use of time
to represent space.
It would be truly extraordinary if the relationship between
space and time were unidirectional in light of the pervasive bidi-
rectionality of neural systems (e.g., Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000),
and of natural systems more broadly. Consider even a very sim-
ple natural system like a chemical reaction in which two reactants
are very strongly driven to form a product (indicated in chemi-
cal formalism by a large forward arrow pointing from reactants
to product). Even in such cases, there is some reformation of the
reactants (indicated by a small backwards arrow from the product
to the reactants).
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When should we expect time to influence space in our minds?
To answer this question, it is useful to consider why the observed
representational asymmetry exists. Metaphor Theorists are care-
ful to point out that space and time are equally basic in our
experience of the world, and that extent in space and in time
are correlated with one another—correlation being an inherently
symmetrical relationship (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Casasanto
et al., 2010). Yet, despite being symmetrically related in the
word, space and time are asymmetrically represented in our
brains (Gijssels et al., 2013) and behaviors (e.g., Casasanto and
Boroditsky, 2008). Perhaps we tend to rely asymmetrically on the
dimension that is easier to perceive, remember, or reconstruct
from physical evidence. That is, we may use space heuristi-
cally as an index of time because, in many cases, the spatial
dimension of an event is more accessible than the temporal.
(“Accessibility” could the mean greater familiarity, perceptual
availability, imageability, memorability, etc.). Alternatively, if con-
texts exist in which space is not more accessible than time we
might not rely on space as an index of time—at least not as much
as we ordinarily do.
ARE SPACE AND TIME SYMMETRICALLY RELATED IN INFANTS’
MINDS?
Evidence for a strong space-time asymmetry in kindergarteners
does not rule out the possibility that space and time could be
symmetrically related in infants’ minds, and that the relation-
ship between the domains becomes asymmetrical over the course
of cognitive development (Casasanto et al., 2010). Lourenco and
Longo (2010) suggested that space and time (and number)may be
symmetrically interrelated in the minds of 9-month-old infants.
In their experiment, infants were trained to associate specific col-
ors and patterns with high or low magnitudes within a single
dimension (e.g., black objects with stripes were large in size; white
objects with spots were small in size). After the training on one
dimension (e.g., size), participants saw similar objects that varied
in magnitude along another dimension (e.g., duration of presen-
tation). The mapping from color/pattern to magnitude was either
preserved (congruent condition) or reversed (incongruent condi-
tion) between the training domain and the test domain. Results
showed that infants spent more time looking at test objects with
incongruent mappings compared to congruent ones, suggesting
that they were generalizing the mapping across domains (e.g.,
from space to time). Crucially for the present discussion, the
process of generalization between space and time was symmet-
ric: there was no difference in the size of the congruity effect
when infants were generalizing from time to space vs. from space
to time. According to Lourenco and Longo (2010, 2011), this
symmetric cross-domain transfer challenges MT and supports
ATOM.
Yet, it may be premature to interpret these data as evidence for
a common analog magnitude metric underlying representations
of duration, size, and number. In order to interpret these data as
support for ATOM, it would be necessary to show that Lourenco
and Longo’s task was a valid test of the relationships between
prothetic domains in infants’ minds (i.e., a valid test of their sym-
metry or asymmetry). At present, the study is difficult to interpret
because it is missing both a manipulation check and a control
condition.
An appropriate manipulation check would demonstrate that
this task can reveal a significant asymmetry in transfer between
domains where such an asymmetry exists in participants’ mental
representations. In the absence of a manipulation check, it is hard
to interpret these data as evidence against a cross-dimensional
asymmetry because the authors’ tests for asymmetries in the
amount of transfer between domains (e.g., from space to time vs.
from time to space) produced null results.
ATOM posits a shared representational substrate for prothetic
domains, only. Therefore, an appropriate control condition
would show that the pattern of transfer found for prothetic
domains would not be found in tests of transfer between
non-prothetic domains (e.g., transfer between two metathetic
domains, or between a prothetic and metathetic domain). For
example, in principle Lourenco and Longo’s paradigm could
show that infants transfer greater size not only to objects with
greater duration (i.e., transfer between two prothetic domains)
but also to objects that produce lower pitches (i.e., transfer
between a prothetic and a metathetic domain). This result would
be expected in light of evidence from another preferential looking
study showing that 4-month-olds intuit a relationship between
larger size and lower pitch (Dolscheid et al., 2012). High and low
pitches do not differ from one another in magnitude (when their
loudness and duration are equated); therefore the mapping from
size to pitch cannot be based on activation of a common mag-
nitude metric. If a size-pitch version of Lourenco and Longo’s
task showed a similar result to Dolscheid et al.’s, this would indi-
cate that their size-time-number data cannot be interpreted as
evidence of an ATOMic generalized magnitude system. Rather,
their results could indicate a broader capacity for transferring
associations across domains.
It remains an open question whether space and time are
linked symmetrically or asymmetrically in infants’ minds; that is,
whether space-time representations start out ATOMic and only
later become metaphoric. Garner-like interference paradigms
may provide the best tool to investigate whether the space-
time relationship is symmetric or asymmetric (Garner, 1976;
Casasanto and Boroditsky, 2008; Casasanto et al., 2010; Merritt
et al., 2010; Gijssels et al., 2013). Adapting Garner-like tasks for
experiments with infants remains a challenge for future research.
CONCLUSIONS
Space and time are related asymmetrically in children’s minds.
Kindergarten and elementary school–aged children can ignore
irrelevant temporal information when making judgments about
space, but they have difficulty ignoring spatial information when
making judgments about time. This asymmetric relationship,
which was predicted on the basis of patterns in metaphorical
language, does not depend on a task-related difference in the per-
ceptual availability of spatial and temporal information in the
stimuli. Results replicate those of Casasanto et al.’s (2010) study
in Greek children, strengthening the finding by removing a pos-
sible confound in the earlier study, and extending it to children
who speak Dutch and Brazilian Portuguese. The observed space-
time asymmetry supports MT, which suggests that people often
use space as a representational scaffold for time, but it challenges
ATOM, which accords equal status to representations of space,
time, and other prothetic dimensions.
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In principle, it is possible that ATOM could be modified to
accommodate a representational asymmetry between space and
time. For example, in his initial ATOM proposal, Walsh (2003)
emphasized that temporal, spatial, and numerical magnitudes
should all be computed by a “common metric,” but he also men-
tioned in passing that “the [general] magnitude system appears
to have a spatial basis” (p. 486). If so—if the “common met-
ric” that ATOM proposes is space, and numerical and temporal
magnitudes are represented via spatial magnitude—then perhaps
ATOM should predict a space-time asymmetry. But if the com-
mon metric in ATOM is space, then ATOM’s most basic claim
becomes: there is a spatial basis for time and number—a claim
that is indistinguishable from MT’s.
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